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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4671
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002203

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DEPT FOR SCA/INS, P, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2016
TAGS: [PTER](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [NP](#)
SUBJECT: INDIANS WANT TO WORK WITH US ON UN PRESENCE IN
NEPAL

REF: KATHMANDU 2166

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

¶1. (C) In an August 14 conversation with the Ambassador, Indian Ambassador Mukherjee expressed Indian support for an expanded UN presence in Nepal, as long as the UN Security Council did not have to authorize that revised role. Mukherjee believed that the GON gave in to all Maoist demands in the last round of negotiations. Mukherjee expressed hope that the Indian and U.S. Missions in New York could work together to ensure that any UN team stressed the importance of separating the Maoists from their weapons before they were allowed into an interim government. End Summary.

India Supports A UN Presence -- But No Security Council

¶2. (C) In the August 14 conversation, Indian Ambassador Mukherjee expressed concern about the recent five-point agreement (reftel) between the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists. Mukherjee worried that the agreement represented a double victory for the Maoists: the GON had folded on specifically mentioning separation of the Maoists from their weapons and abandoned specific wording that the Maoists could not enter an interim government until their weapons were managed. Mukherjee believed that some in the GON viewed the five-point agreement as a panacea. These elements of the GON hoped that a UN mission would, in effect, do the GON's work and negotiate a tougher deal with the Maoists.

¶3. (C) Mukherjee stressed that, while he had no specific instructions on the issue yet, he was confident Delhi was not ready to transfer Nepal's sovereignty in the peace process to the United Nations. Mukherjee saw a UN role as important, but was adamant that any mandate for a UN mission should not come from the Security Council, but from the Secretary General. Delhi would not support a Security Council resolution. Mukherjee suggested that India and the United

States work closely in New York to shape the expanded UN mission in Nepal. The Ambassador and Mukherjee agreed that a UN mission needed to be clear that a peace process in Nepal would fail unless the Maoists were separated from their weapons. When the Ambassador raised the issue of financing a UN mission, especially one not under the aegis of the Security Council, Mukherjee conceded that he had not yet thought financial issues through in detail.

Comment

¶4. (C) The GON has made it clear to us that it is sticking to the bottom line to separate the Maoists from their weapons before they enter any interim government. However, the GON wavered and then caved in to the Maoists in the last round of negotiations. We must continue to show strong support for the GON and press it to stick to its position on arms management.

¶5. (S/NF) Embassy Kathmandu believes the time is ripe to intensify conversations in New York to proactively shape the process if a UN mission to Nepal is formed. In this context, we are particularly concerned by second-hand reports we have received that some UN officials have assured the Maoists that they would be able to keep at least half of their weapons outside the UN-monitored cantonments. We do not know whether the sort of UN mission envisaged in the joint letters can be done through the good offices of the Secretary General or needs UN Security Council authorization. That said, it makes sense to work closely with the Government of India to ensure that the UN clearly understands that the Maoists must be separated from their weapons if there is to be a successful peace process here.

MORIARTY